How this draw is provable

Before entries closed we published a commitment: a one-way fingerprint (SHA-256) of a secret random seed. After the draw we revealed the seed. Because the commitment was public before entries closed, the seed could not have been changed afterwards to draw a particular ticket.

The draw also folds in a public randomness beacon (drand, the League of Entropy) whose value is only published after entries close. Anyone can re-fetch the exact beacon round below and confirm the same value went into the draw.

Commitment (published before entries closed)

7fadaed481de210f79a25321da17be73463ef57e6a242c82d0f50807f14bbd9a

Revealed seed (published after the draw)

6ddb60e3b4071542ec85a4bdcf9d4d0348ea37eb70586a28f614ad0692213b54

Beacon round (emitted after close) & its public value

Round 6,362,427 on the drand chain 8990e7a9aaed2ffed73dbd7092123d6f289930540d7651336225dc172e51b2ce

8fb064bfdce4ed7248698dabc1a5e724e81c8853ea9d8508912a05fc21663c85

Re-fetch it: curl https://api.drand.sh/8990e7a9aaed2ffed73dbd7092123d6f289930540d7651336225dc172e51b2ce/public/6362427

Check it yourself

1. The seed matches the commitment

Run SHA-256 on the revealed seed - it equals the commitment above. For example, in a terminal:

printf '%s' '6ddb60e3b4071542ec85a4bdcf9d4d0348ea37eb70586a28f614ad0692213b54' | sha256sum

2. The seed and the beacon draw the winning ticket number

The 950 ticket numbers that went into this draw are lined up in ascending order; the locked-in seed mixed with the post-close beacon value shown above (both are in the $msg below) picks one. The seed was committed before entries closed, and the public beacon that decides the winner didn't exist until after - so the result couldn't be set in advance or predicted. Sort the numbers in play (their fingerprint is below, and the full set is in the entrants list) and recompute - you'll get ticket #651:

$seed    = '6ddb60e3b4071542ec85a4bdcf9d4d0348ea37eb70586a28f614ad0692213b54';
$tickets = [ /* the 950 ticket numbers in the draw, sorted ascending */ ];
$total   = count($tickets);
$msg     = 'draw:019f37e6-58d5-7128-984c-b3be5657f07c:'.$total.':8fb064bfdce4ed7248698dabc1a5e724e81c8853ea9d8508912a05fc21663c85';   // note: the trailing value is the drand beacon above
$span    = 1 << 60;                        // 60-bit space
$limit   = intdiv($span, $total) * $total; // reject above this to remove bias
$i = 0;
do {
    $n = (int) hexdec(substr(hash_hmac('sha256', $msg.':'.$i, $seed), 0, 15));
    $i++;
} while ($n >= $limit);
echo $tickets[$n % $total];                 // => winning ticket #651

3. Ticket #651 belongs to the winner

That ticket number is held by exactly one entry - John M. from Alva. We publish a fingerprint of every ticket number in the draw, so the set of numbers can't be altered after the fact, and we hold the full list in our tamper-evident audit trail, available to the Advertising Standards Authority on request.

Ticket-numbers fingerprint

99d3029dde552551de965caae1a6cc65ea52790d6a34513f5ee6510a11e4c2be

How ticket numbers are assigned

On this competition you don’t choose your ticket number, and it isn’t simply the next number in order. When you buy, the system gives you a number using a secret shuffle that was set when the competition opened, before anyone had bought a ticket, and can’t be changed after.

Because that shuffle is secret and gives everyone a different number:

• Two people can never end up with the same number.
• Nobody, not you and not us, can guess which number a purchase will get. On this draw the number itself isn’t what picks the winner - that’s the draw above, which nobody can predict.
• Your number is fixed the instant you buy, and recorded straight away.

We keep the shuffle secret so no one can work out in advance which number a purchase will get, which is what stops anyone targeting a winning ticket. Every number that’s given out still appears in the competition’s entrants list, so the numbers in play are public and can’t be quietly changed later.

You can see them: every entry and its ticket number is listed on the competition’s entrants page.

// 1. the key matches the fingerprint published at open:
printf '%s' 'Lmp48js4lL3Do9bBtkW2lSRXc06Em8JBx7OUMeJ9' | sha256sum        // => f462d58fb6e7228fdd8c3e3e7a029793ddb3531e3834fbdf8320e4ac08b483cd

// 2. re-run the shuffle: position -> ticket number
$seed   = 'Lmp48js4lL3Do9bBtkW2lSRXc06Em8JBx7OUMeJ9';
$domain = 3370;   // the pool the numbers are shuffled within
$prf = fn($v,$r) => (int) hexdec(substr(hash('sha256', "$seed:$r:$v"), 0, 8));
$permute = function(int $pos) use ($domain, $prf) {
    $half = (int) ceil(((int) ceil(log($domain, 2))) / 2);
    $mask = (1 << $half) - 1;
    $x = $pos - 1;
    do {
        $l = ($x >> $half) & $mask; $r = $x & $mask;
        for ($i = 0; $i < 4; $i++) { $n = $l ^ ($prf($r, $i) & $mask); $l = $r; $r = $n; }
        $x = ($l << $half) | $r;
    } while ($x >= $domain);
    return $x + 1;
};
// $permute(1), $permute(2), ... are the ticket numbers, in the order they were issued.